For decades, there has been persistent controversy concerning brain death, or the determination of death by neurological criteria, among physicians, philosophers, and the lay public. This article examines the various ways that brain death is conceptualized and justified, as well as the persistent questions and controversies related to brain death, particularly within pluralistic, multicultural societies. A culturally sensitive and practical way forward is proposed.
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Death is universal, one of the inevitable bookends of human existence. For much of human history, bodily decomposition and rigor mortis served as certain signs of death. There are ancient references as well to the link between breath and life, for example in the Old Testament and the Quran. In modern history, death has been understood to occur when the heart stops and blood circulation ceases. Defining and determining death as the loss of circulatory-respiratory or cardiopulmonary function enjoys near universal acceptance, across cultures and religious traditions. A more recent way of defining and determining death-brain death or death by neurological criteria-has fairly broad international acceptance as a medically valid and legal way to determine and define death, but there is a lack of international consensus about what constitutes brain death, and what diagnostic criteria are appropriate.
Moreover, several religious sects and traditions reject brain death as death, and there remains persistent confusion about brain death amongst the lay public in countries where it is a legal standard of death. Resistance to brain death occasionally reaches a crisis point when a family objects to withdrawal of treatment following a determination of brain death. Recent cases include that of Jahi McMath in the USA, and Child A in the UK, both involving religious objections to brain death. 1, 2 In such cases, it is often left to courts to adjudicate when healthcare providers and families cannot agree about withdrawing physiological support from patients determined to be brain dead. While courts are appropriate venues for the interpretation of law, they are less than ideal settings for grappling with the complexities of death as a social, cultural, moral, religious and medical phenomenon. In 2008 the President's Council on Bioethics provided a rationale for equating WBD and death, stating that 'total brain failure can continue to serve as a criterion for declaring death. . . because it is a sign that this organism can no longer engage in the essential work that defines living things'. 6 That essential work includes 'self-preservation' and 'need-driven commerce with the surrounding world', and specifically requires breathing and consciousness. 6 Critics were quick to point to counterexamples of undeniably living persons and organisms who are unconscious and unable to breathe independently, including persons in apneic coma, high cervical quadriplegics in a vegetative state (VS), and fetuses. Some critics of the WBD standard have called it a useful and convenient "legal fiction", necessary to facilitate organ donation, but not equivalent to death. 7 Truog
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and Miller describe the brain death 'dogma' as 'bending biological reality to serve perceived public policy needs'. 8 
Brainstem death
Brainstem death is the standard for neurological death used in the UK, Canada and India. Brainstem death is the 'irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness combined with the irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe'. 9 The reticular activating system and nuclei for cardiorespiratory regulation reside in the brainstem, and are key components of consciousness and respiratory control; their loss results in brainstem death. The brainstem standard is vulnerable to the same objections levied against the 'total brain failure' standard. Brainstem death does not imply the loss of 'all' brain functions; preserved cortical electrical activity and intracranial blood flow are compatible with it. Accordingly, it has been argued that brainstem death entails a lower burden of proof than WBD. 10 In practice, clinical procedures for determining brainstem death and WBD are quite similar.
Other definitions of brain death
A philosophical underpinning of both WBD and brainstem death is that the loss of brain function entails the death of a person because it entails the irreversible loss of consciousness. Some philosophers and physicians have suggested alternative definitions of death, based on the understanding that whether the body or the brain can be said to have died, ceased functioning, or lost integrity is beside the point. They frame death not as a biological phenomenon, but as psychological or moral: what matters is that the 'person' is gone. In that light, the permanent loss of consciousness is death. 11,12 Veatch, for example, denies that death can be defined biologically, and argues that the loss of personhood is morally relevant, for it signals the loss of moral standing, and appropriately precipitates death-related activities.
12
Problematically for this view, there are individuals who have permanently lost consciousness, such as those in the chronic VS, who are not considered dead yet, with all that death entails in the way of social, cultural, legal, and religious practices. The intuition that patients in the VS are 'as good as dead', or even 'more dead than dead' is not uncommon, and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from VS patients is widely viewed as morally and legally permissible. 13 There is a significant problem of misdiagnosis in the VS, however, and an estimated 43% of VS patients are misdiagnosed as unconscious, and retain some level of residual, undetectable consciousness. 14 If we declare VS patients to be not just metaphorically dead, but actually dead, misdiagnosis becomes an even more acute problem, and one that would compound, rather than simplify, existing concerns about brain death. As Bernat notes, death-as-loss-of-consciousness declares dead people who are regarded as alive in every society and culture, and 'contrives a redefinition of death'. 10 
Sources of lay misgivings about brain death: intuitive, traditional, and commonsense
Brain death is counterintuitive. The brain dead 'corpse' remains warm, moves spontaneously, and retains many essential biological functions, including heartbeat and circulation, digestion, excretion, homeostasis, thermoregulation and hormonal and immunological functions. Lengthy 'survivals' of the brain dead have been documented. Shewmon describes brain dead children who remained alive for years and exhibited proportional growth. 15 In the USA, Jahi McMath, on physiological support since December 2013, has undergone puberty. 16 There are several cases in the literature of brain dead pregnant women who were maintained on life support, and gestated and gave birth to living infants. Amongst the general public, there remains considerable uncertainty about brain death. Siminoff et al. found that only 40.3% think people declared brain dead are actually dead, while more believe them to be 'as good as dead', but not actually dead. 17 When detailed information about brain dead patients is provided (e.g. that there is EEG activity, and the heart beats), the lay public is less likely to equate brain death with death. 18 
Religious and cultural objections to brain death
Several religious traditions and sects, including Orthodox Judaism, Buddhism and some Native American spiritual traditions, accept the circulatory-respiratory definition of death, but do not recognize brain death. In Buddhist tradition, death occurs when the body is bereft of vitality, heat, and consciousness. There is uncertainty about how these traditional indicators track with modern medical concepts, but many Buddhists, especially Japanese and Tibetan Buddhists, reject brain death. 19 Brain death is recognized in several Islamic countries, but there is no international consensus on how brain death must be interpreted under Islamic law or doctrine, and some Muslim juridical bodies reject it altogether. 20 Rady and Verheijde 21 note that the Quran explicitly distinguishes between the dying process and death, with the latter being 'biologic disintegration' that occurs after the dying process is complete. As such, 'endorsement of brain death as true death directly conflicts with the Quran'. In the case of Child A, in Manchester UK, a Muslim family from Saudi Arabia challenged a determination of brainstem death in their 19-month-old child. While the family and physicians were at odds over the termination of ventilatory support, the local Coroner intervened and claimed jurisdiction over the child's body, declared it 'wholly inappropriate for a deceased body to be intubated and ventilated when this is futile', and requested extubation and removal of the body to the mortuary. 2 In a High Court decision, Mr Justice Hayden rebuffed the Coroner's attempted intervention, but nonetheless agreed with the hospital that ventilatory support should be terminated to allow the child 'dignity in death', thus signaling acceptance of brainstem death as legal death in the UK. 22 Notably, the court decision came only 2 days after the diagnosis of brainstem death.
Conclusion: a way forward
In a pluralistic, multicultural society there are diverse viewpoints on contentious and deeply important matters, and few aspects of human existence have the cultural, social, spiritual and personal gravity of death. There is no single, unifying definition of death that can handle all cases where there is a need to determine death in technologically advanced societies. To return to an ancient, though surely uncontroversial understanding in which rigor mortis or putrefaction signal death would make organ donation and transplantation impossible, and would unacceptably result in hospital beds occupied by literally decaying corpses. As Racine notes, technological advances have blurred the line between life and death, but that line was always blurred and approximate. 23 Any certainty perceived to exist in the prescientific, lay understandings of death is illusory, but so is certainty from a continuously evolving scientific understanding. The pragmatic solution Racine proposes is the embrace of the best provisional knowledge about brain death as a basis for medical practice and public policy, with honest acknowledgment of the evolving nature of that knowledge. 24 Brain death may not square with traditional understandings of death, but it need not do so to be useful or necessary. As a practical, clinical matter, the absence of a culturally universal definition or understanding of death can lead to distress and conflict when local, accepted medical practice clashes with cultural and religious tenets, as happened in the Child A case. Declarations of death that do not accord with accepted cultural or spiritual understandings can appear overbearing and paternalistic to patients' families, or worse, suggest cultural imperialism, none of which are conducive to furthering understanding or compassionate care. An ethical, culturally sensitive, but also medically and socially sound way to adjudicate important competing claims is thus critical. Although the courts can settle brain death disputes in accordance with law, they cannot legislate away the important human concerns at stake. Indeed, distressed families may be left feeling even more aggrieved if death seems a matter of legal fiat.
It must be acknowledged that there are irreconcilable differences between some lay understandings of death, and current medically accepted definitions of brain death. Sensitivity to these cultural and religious differences requires doing more than letting the law act as final arbiter. While our scientific understanding of death is evolving, presumably towards greater subtlety and clarity, in democratic societies the law also evolves, and sometimes shifts dramatically, lending unwelcome support to the perception that determinations of death are intolerably plagued by arbitrariness and social convenience.
Although many societies are increasingly multicultural, creating the potential for more frequent friction, clashes concerning brain death remain quite rare, such that their potential to disrupt medical or legal practice is quite small. Tincture of time often provides the cure. When it cannot, ethical and compassionate care that seeks to avoid paternalism and cultural imperialism calls for other remedies, including allowing patients' families to consult and negotiate with culturally and spiritually competent mediators. 25 Legal remedies have been enacted in some locales, such as the law in New Jersey, USA that allows religious objections to declarations of brain death, with circulatory-respiratory death as the mandated alternative.
1 Circulatory-respiratory death is almost universally accepted, and is legal death where statutes regarding the determination and definition of death exist. Allowing conscientious objections, and reliance on circulatory-respiratory death as an available, medically and legally acceptable option, can provide a compassionate, culturally sensitive compromise in vexing cases where differences appear otherwise irreconcilable.
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